Offering alternatives as a way of issuing directives to children: putting the worse option last How do people get each other to do things? Work on requesting in interaction (Lindström, 2005; Heinemann, 2006; Curl and Drew, 2008) has prompted an acceleration of interest in the varieties of ways of influencing others: from (to use rough glosses) hinting , through advising (Shaw and Hepburn, 2013) , to proposing (Stevanovic 2012, Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2012) , instructing (Antaki and Kent, 2012) and outright threatening (Hepburn and Potter, 2011 ; see also a quantitative survey of many these types in Takada 2013).
As Stevanovic and Svennevig (this volume) say, this Special Issue adds to the body of research by reporting new work on the epistemic and deontic subtleties of the ways in which directives can be issued. In this article we explore how adults use an utterance the syntactic form of which offers children alternative courses of action to choose between; but which, on inspection of their deployment, can be seen to perform a less neutral action.
To prefigure the data that we shall analyse, examples of the three types of directives that we found in our survey of various data sources are: you've got to stand here with it or it goes back in the cupboard; come down at once or I shall send you straight to bed; and do you want to put them neatly in the corner for mummy please or do you wanna go to bed. These directives use different syntactic formats, but the common thread among them is the action that the adult is performing: issuing an utterance that confronts the child with two exclusive courses of action. One of these courses is favoured; the other, not. The effect of the utterance is to issue a recommendation at best, or a threat at worst; but in any case, it is a directive, claiming some form of deontic authority, in the terminology suggested by Stevanovic (2012) , and Stevanovic and Peräkylä (2012) . As we shall see, there is a puzzle about how the adults set out the alternatives in one of those formats, and solving it that will be the focus of our analysis.
Requests, directives and alternatives
As helpfully outlined in the introduction to this Special Issue (Stevanovic & Svennevig, this volume) , the impetus for an interactional (as opposed to a syntactic or pragmatic) study of directives can be said to have come from Heinemann's 2006 work on requests to home helpers, but perhaps more significantly from Curl and Drew's (2008) paper on telephone requests to doctors' clinics and to family members. Curl and Drew identified two factors with which one could mark one's request: the degree of entitlement one had in making it, and the degree to which one acknowledged the contingencies that the recipient might face in carrying it out. Thus, they reported, a call for medical help could assert the caller's right to receive attention at home, irrespective of the inconvenience to the doctor; or, conversely, could be put tentatively to indicate uncertain entitlement and an acknowledgement of the imposition made.
Work on entitlement and contingency has subsequently been profitably extended, and since our interest is in adults' deontic authority over children, the direction that most concerns us is the work on imperatives during family mealtime conversations initiated by Craven & Potter (2010) . Their focus on imperative formulations more starkly revealed participants' orientations to the management of deontic asymmetries. For example, contextual factors such as who was at fault or how urgently an action needed to be performed could be drawn on by speakers to provide a warrant for more entitled formulations (Antaki & Kent, 2012) . Recipients, as well as speakers, designed their talk to display their deontic stance towards the projected course of action. When responding to parental directives, the timing and nature of a child's compliance could enable them to regain autonomy over their behaviour without openly defying the directive (Kent 2012) . In other words, it was found that the struggle over deontic authority could play out in such a way as not only to identify what rights and entitlements are in play between the participants, but also what the possibilities and consequences of compliance or resistance might be.
In delving further into the possibilities and consequences of directives by a more extensive empirical survey of the formats that adults used, we were struck by how the syntactic format of "or" alternatives could work as an action to get the child to do something (or stop doing something). So far as we know, this use of alternatives -although it has a hinterland in the pragmatics literature (see, for a comprehensive account of conditional connectives, Declerck and Reed, 2001) - has not yet been remarked on in the interactional literature on directives. As we shall see, its study throws up two intriguing issues in how adults manage their deontic authority: their flouting of the fundamental conversational norm of contiguity, and their ostensible privileging of the child's choice in complying with warnings and threats.
Data: sources
We searched for adults' use of alternatives in talking to children in two sets of sources: audio data deposited in the online resource Talkbank i , and video data held at Loughborough University, and at Keele University.
a) Talkbank audio data
From the CHILDES data in the Talkbank database (MacWhinney, 2007) we randomly selected six sources, representing about 240 hours of USA and UK recordings across a range of adult-child interactions, although the bulk of them are mother-child conversations. The age of the children in the recordings we sampled ranged from 1 year 9 months to 7 years 11 months.
b) The Loughborough and Keele family-meal video datasets
The Loughborough data are from three UK, native-English-speaking families with small children, representing about 12 hours of talk at mealtimes. The ages of children here were less precisely recorded than in the CHILDES dataset, but ranged between 3 years and 8 years old. The Talkbank and Loughborough datasets were used for our main survey, but later (as explained below) we also had recourse to a small corpus held at Keele University (the Beeston family-meal dataset, comprising 4 hours of mealtime conversations between 2 UK, native English-speaking families with children aged 3-11 years old). This latter small collection was inspected for supplementary video evidence of children's visible compliance with the directives.
Selection of cases
We were after cases where we understood that the child was being directed to do something (that is, where at least one course of action was being proposed) in an utterance syntactically marked by the connective or. That meant separating our set of cases from three neighbouring sets, using our native judgements as speakers (see Stivers, 2015, and Steensig and Heinemann, 2015 , for a discussion of such quasi-coding procedures). One set was those or-marked offers that were not, in fact, directives -rather, they were apparently genuine enquiries about the child's preference between options about which the adult seemed to have no We also discounted cases where or was in turn-final position (for a recent study of which, see Drake, 2013) , since by definition the second item was unspecified.
The selection of directives using or yielded 58 cases from about 252 hours of adult-child conversation in the TalkBank and Loughborough data. ii
Data: basic types and their examples
The adults' use of or in their directives were exclusively and exhaustively separable into three syntactic formats: imperatives, interrogatives and declaratives (42%, 21% and 13% respectively, of our sample of 58 cases). In each case this meant the child being presented with descriptions of two courses of action. If we look to see what actual content is being inserted into the syntactic frame, we see that in all cases, the options were asymmetric: one was more favourably (or less unfavourably) described than the other. Thus there would be the alternatives, for example, of being silly on the one hand or eating properly on the other, and so on. This asymmetry is a strong hint as to what the utterances were doing. Let us see examples of each format before going on to that interactional analysis.
Imperative plus consequential alternative of non-compliance
Here the adult directs the child by giving them an ultimatum, in the form of a direct imperative followed by an aversive consequence that would ensue were it not followed.
Example 1: Eng-UK/Thomas/3-00-14.cha line 1591 "be gentle" 
Declarative plus consequential alternative
In these cases, the directive is issued by an utterance in which a course of action described with a modal verb (can, may, will, need etcetera) is paired, again, with an aversive consequence that would ensue if it were not chosen. 
Interrogative with alternatives
Here the directive is issued in interrogative format, where the child is offered a choice or asked to express a preference between two courses of action.
Example 5: Eng-UK/Thomas/4-05-09.cha line 592 "go home" ("INV" is a visitor) To summarise: these three syntactic forms of offering alternatives to the child entail a choice between two manifestly differently-valenced courses of action.
Clearly these syntactic forms are freighted with interactional meaning: these aren't bloodless alternatives, nor even proposals or suggestions; they are something deontically stronger.
"Or" in the service of warning and threatening.
All of these syntactically-marked 'or' directives -imperative, modal or interrogative -are being issued with the extra force that identifying a consequence delivers. Bringing a foreseeable negative consequence onto the child's horizon is, as a speech-act analyst would immediately say, to issue something like a warning or perhaps even a threat. Indeed it seems to be grammatically as it were hard-wired into the format: as Declerck and Reed put it, when "the finite or-clause usually refers to post-present actualisation" -as indeed all of ours do -"it is always interpreted as a threat or warning, not as a Note that Mum who has control over the consequences, so this comes off as a threat (in British English, a common current penalty trope is to be made to sit for a given period on the bottom step, or the 'naughty' step, of the staircase in the home So all in all, although speakers are not obliged to do so, the adults in our survey used a format which either obliged them to put the worse alternative second (in the 38 cases of imperative or declarative formats), or usually to put it second anyway, even if there was a choice (in 14 of the 20 cases of interrogatives). Why is this notable?
Flouting contiguity
It is notable because, as Sacks had established as one of the first principles to emerge from Conversation Analysis, the normative expectation is that one's addressee orient to the last thing one says (i.e., the most contiguous to her or his turn at turn at talk). Sacks (1987: 60) An example of or in the service of a candidate hearing (Koshik, 2005, p 197 Tamar is offering, in line 5, a corrective repair initiator -she thinks that Libby meant that the book was abridged (not revised). (As it happens, Libby resists this and reasserts that it was indeed revised.) Libby's answer is less important to note than the preference expressed in Tamar's question: that the second alternative be the correct one.
Comparing these repair-initiations to our directives, then, the question that arises is this: if Koshik's analysis of repair-questions putting the desirable option second extends to directives, then the adult ought to put the desirable, positive directed course of action (as they would a repair) in second, contiguous position.
That would put, as it does with repair, conversational pressure for the recipient to confirm the positive option. But, as we have seen, this is the exact reverse of what happens in our adult-child directives. The second, contiguous, ready-to-beresponded to option is the worse one.
Somehow, then, the adult is achieving their goal of directing the child towards complying with the first option (not using too much salt and so on) by, in fact, inviting them conversationally to address the second, more contiguous, option
(not being able to eat the egg and so on).
Uptake Do the children 'get it', and see that the adult is not, in fact, inviting them to take up the second alternative? It is not always possible to tell from the (audio) transcripts in the Talkbank data, because the child's compliance (that is, their orientation to the first rather than the second alternative) may go unremarked as such. In no case did we ever see the adult explicitly praise the child for carrying out the directive. There were plenty of cases, though, where business moves on, implying that the adult was satisfied. For example:
Example 13: Braunwald/2-06-15.cha line 59 "salt" (Expansion of example 4 above) The mother's injunction to stop salting the egg seems to be successful; although no-one comments on it as such, the absence of further directives and the apparently harmonious talk seems to indicate that matters were resolved satisfactorily. This matches the typical sequential pattern for parental directives described by Kent (2011) in which explicit orientations to completed compliance were almost entirely absent from the data. Instead, the most recurrent practice was for an unmarked transition to other topics of conversation following compliance.
For video evidence we may also call up some reinforcements from some further work we undertook with a new small sample (we are grateful to Michelle
Beeston for collecting and transcribing these data):
Example 14 (Beeston: Morris_01) "switch it off" 
[((Mum looks at Jimmy and raises her eyebrows))]
4 → Mum: Don't Jimmy or you'll just go to bed.
((Jimmy takes another drink and swallows it))
In both of these cases the evidence is that the imperatives work immediately (although we don't know if they would have done so had they been issued on their own, without the or-refaced consequence (... or I'm going to switch it off; ... or you'll just go to bed) being spelled out).
Even the audio records provide corollary evidence in the form of occasions on which the child seems to resist the directive, and things do not run smoothly.
Compare that with what happens here, where the issue if the child putting on a blanket:
Example 16: Eng-NA/Nelson/811220.cha line 178 "blanket" (expansion of Example 3 above). Unlike the salting-egg case, here there is turbulence after the directive. The adult is manifestly unsatisfied, and in a series of increments repeats the directive, in stripped-down form (blanket or no blanket, line 27). The episode seems to end in a compromise where the child lies down, but without the blanket; but it all runs off far less smoothly than when the or-formatted directive is understood and complied with immediately. Taken all together, the evidence seems to be that adults are justified in attributing to children -even quite young children -the ability to understand the flouting of contiguity when confronted by warnings and threats.
DISCUSSION
We set out to examine how adults directed children by offering them alternatives. Put so baldly, 'offering alternatives' -with what one might imagine to be, syntactically, its default position of equality between the options -sounds egalitarian and respectful of the child's preferences, sensitively avoiding outright direction. But inspection showed that this was manifestly not so. These were all directives of a rather forceful kind. This is to be set against Stevanovic and Peräkylä's (2012) observation that deontic authority over another person is something to be handled delicately.
That was strongly implied in Curl and Drew's (2008) analysis of data from calls requesting house calls from out-of-hours doctors' clinics, where the caller had to negotiate the gap between their needs and the authority of the doctor, who had the decisive vote. Hence the caller's display of entitlement and awareness of contingency in the making of requests. Even when the request comes from the senior partner in an interaction, such sensitivities can still be of concern: in Stevanovic and Peräkylä's (2012) study of colleagues in a work setting, the senior member, although institutionally higher in the official hierarchy, nevertheless did not simply issue bald instructions to the junior. As with calls to the doctor, there was a clear display of some degree of orientation to the other's agency, or choice in the matter (see a fuller discussion of responsibility for action in Couper-Kuhlen and Etelämäki's article, this volume).
The sensitivity to too-naked deontic authority in the exchange of requests (in Curl and Drew) and suggestions (in Stevanovic and Peräkylä) is an index of a relationship that is close enough in authority -between adults at work, or even in service encounters -to make the exercise of power negotiable. With parents and their children, the matter seems very different. Previous work on parents'
directives (Craven & Potter, 2010; Antaki & Kent, 2012; Kent 2012 ) strongly suggested that negotiations were much more one-sided. And the research that we report in this article reveals that or-formatted directives are a vehicle for a particularly loaded way of issuing warnings and threats -while appearing to be sensitive to the child's freedom of choice.
In an or-formatted directive, the child is of course faced with a choice, and is being -ostensibly -left to make the decision between them on the basis of their own judgement and preferences (most explicitly in interrogative ors, where the appeal to the child's preferences can be actually built into the alternatives, as in, for example, do you want to put them neatly in the corner for mummy please or do you wanna go to bed.
But with or, the alternatives are set out such that the negative one is placed last (by definition in the case of imperatives and declaratives, and, in our sample, by the adults' general preference in the case of interrogatives). It is this that differentiates or from if/then and other conditional connectives. A directive with or necessarily makes the negative alternative highly salient, making the child orient to something expressly bad. The child has (as it were consciously) to ignore the highly salient, contiguous, negative alternative being dangled in front of them, and choose the earlier non-contiguous option. Adults assume that the children will understand this flouting of the contiguity principle, and the children seem to do so.
Although it might be unlikely to see this loaded use of alternatives in more symmetric relationships, where deontic authority is not quite so unevenly distributed, and no threat or warning seems to be at issue, we have found a telling case of contiguity being flouted in an interrogative in a very different, adult, environment. Heritage & Roth (1995) , in their analysis of news interviews, include this example (see example 17, below). It is that sense of a rhetorical trap that the children are alive to when confronted by the parent's or-formatted directive -especially when we notice that all the directives we found mark a fault of some kind. Just as in our examination elsewhere of imperatives issued to children and to adults with intellectual impairment (Antaki and Kent, 2012) , the or-directives here would be reactive to something that the issuer considered unacceptable or inopportune: not eating or not eating properly, being too rough, not talking clearly, taking too much of something, and such catch-alls as 'being silly'. So the environment favours an urgent directive, set up in such a way that the child ends up heeding the warning (or threat) and choosing the course of action that the adult favours vii .
Warnings and threats can be thought of as privileging two different kinds of authority that the speaker has over their recipient: warnings imply greater epistemic authority (the speaker claims more awareness the consequences of the action) while threats imply greater deontic authority (the speaker advertises their greater, perhaps sole, control over the consequences of the action). It is possible to identify cases where it is arguable that the adult is issuing the directive somewhat ambivalently, disguising a threat (with its greater deontic load) as a mere warning (where the asymmetry is only epistemic). Here is an example:
Example 18 Eng-UK/Thomas/3-07-03.cha 274 "have to move" Interactionally, this favours the second, more tractable alternative (an agentless "anger") -but this has the advantage of making the child's choice of the serious alternative (really wanting to die) a deliberate resistance to the 'easier', more contiguous, answer, and so more diagnostically valuable. The theme this shares with our directives is that it privileges -for very different reasons -the child's own choice in the alternatives being presented to them.
We might conclude with a speculation about children's understanding of a conversational normative rule being flouted. If our interpretation is right, then at least in the interrogative format of or, we seem to be seeing unusually young children appreciating irony in conversation viii . In the psychological literature, a child's understanding of others' private intentions and beliefs, as displayed in the Theory of Mind false belief task (Lang and Perner, 2002) puts it at about 4 yearswhereas some of the children in our data sample were well below that age (Lara, for example, whose mother contributed 21 of the directives, was aged between 1 year and 9 months to 3 years and 3 months). There is an echo here of the interactional competences of children revealed in the close analyses by Wootton In sum, then, the data we report here identifies three formats for using alternatives as a vehicle for directives which warn and threaten. The interactional effect is that they seemingly preserve the child's choice and agency, while tipping the balance heavily in favour of the adult's preference. To come off successfully, they rely on the child being able to decode a flouting of the normative conventions of contiguity in conversation, adding a further piece of evidence to our appreciation of the early understanding of interactional exchanges.
vii On this point, it is worth noting that in the Talkbank data, directives were very rare in recordings where the adult was joining the child in pretend play. One explanation may be that in pretend play the child may genuinely be allowed to have the epistemic and deontic upper hand about what is going on, compared to the business of finishing one's dinner.
viii As one of the reviewers pointed out, this would not be true of or when in the imperative format, as in "gently or you'll break it", which does not require any appreciation of irony.
